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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case we consider for the first time the interplay 
between the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1681–1681x, and the Higher Education Act of 1965 
(“HEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1155, with respect to the 
responsibilities of an institution of higher education that 
furnishes information on student loan indebtedness to a 
consumer reporting agency (“CRA”).  Edward M. Seamans 
appeals an order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which granted summary 
judgment to defendant Temple University (“Temple”) on 
Seamans’s claims for negligent and willful violations of 
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FCRA in connection with Temple’s reporting of certain 
information to CRAs concerning Seamans’s student loan.  For 
the following reasons, we will vacate and remand. 
I. 
On January 16, 1989, Seamans received a need-based 
Federal Perkins Loan (the “Loan”) of $1,180.00 from 
Temple.  The first payment on the Loan was due on January 
20, 1992.  Upon Seamans’s failure to make payment within 
the fifteen-day grace period, the loan was declared delinquent 
on February 4, 1992.  On August 3, 1992, with the full 
balance of the Loan still unpaid, Temple notified Seamans 
that the account had been placed for collection. 
 In January 2010, Seamans enrolled as a full-time 
student at Drexel University.  In the spring of 2011, Seamans 
sought financial aid in the form of a Pell Grant, but Drexel 
refused to provide Seamans with financial assistance until he 
repaid the balance of the still-outstanding Loan.  On April 28, 
2011, Seamans repaid the Loan in full. 
In May 2011, allegedly for the first time in many 
years, Seamans noticed a “trade line” on his credit report 
summarizing data pertaining to the Loan.  For reasons 
unknown, that trade line may or may not have actually 
appeared on Seamans’s credit report at the times it 
indisputably should have—namely, between February 1992 
and April 2011, when the account was in default.  Because 
Seamans’s claim is predicated only on Temple’s conduct after 
he disputed the trade line, whether and how Temple reported 
information about the Loan before Seamans lodged his 
dispute is irrelevant.  
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What is not in dispute is that in the aftermath of 
Seamans’s repayment of the Loan, Temple reported certain 
Loan-related data to TransUnion, a CRA.  We observe at the 
outset that much reporting of consumer credit data, including 
the bulk of the reporting by Temple in this case, takes the 
form of “codes” rather than text.  For the sake of clarity, we 
refer primarily to the underlying interpretations of the codes, 
which are undisputed, rather than to the codes themselves.  
Relevant categories of coded information include (1) the 
“date of first delinquency,” which refers to the initial date 
upon which the loan had been marked as defaulted; (2) the 
“payment history,” which documents the debtor’s month-by-
month payment record; (3) the “account status,” which 
documents a particular status for a given debt, including 
whether an account is open, closed, paid, or unpaid; and (4) 
the “compliance condition,” which indicates whether the 
reported information is disputed by the consumer. 
In the aftermath of Seamans’s payment, Temple had 
provided the following information to TransUnion: 
(a) [Seamans] had been over 180 
days late for at least twenty-four 
(24) months prior to the time the 
Perkins [L]oan was paid in full;  
 
(b) the Account Status was 
report[ed] as ‘Current; Paid or 
Paying as Agreed;’ 
 
(c) the Balance was report[ed] as 
‘$0;’ 
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(d) the High Balance was 
report[ed] as ‘$1180;’ 
 
(e) the Terms was report[ed] as 
‘120 Monthly $30;’ 
 
(f) the Date Open was report[ed] 
as ‘10/1991;’ and 
 
(g) the Date Closed was 
report[ed] as ‘04/2011.’ 
 
App. 64–65.  Temple did not report the date of first 
delinquency for the Loan (i.e., February 4, 1992), and also did 
not report that the account had ever been placed for 
collection. 
On May 17 and May 20, 2011, Seamans formally 
disputed portions of that information by contacting 
TransUnion.  Seamans’s May 17 dispute, which he submitted 
online, stated: 
Loan defaulted 1992.  Temple 
didn’t report in a decade+, and 
charged off long ago.  I paid 
Temple on 4/30, they 
retroactively reported years of 
120d late payments, but it had 
been co’d.  Nothing from Temple 
was on my report until I fully paid 
to close account.  Why does 
report show two years of late 
payments? 
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App. 207.  Seamans’s May 20 dispute was made by 
telephone.  TransUnion in turn notified Temple of the May 17 
and May 20 disputes and asked it to verify, among other 
things, the “payment history profile” and “account status” of 
the Loan.  
In response, Temple, through its loan servicer, ACS 
Education Services, Inc. (“ACS”), conducted an 
investigation.  ACS had contracted with Temple to respond to 
consumer disputes on Temple’s behalf in exchange for $2 per 
dispute “received and processed” by ACS.  The procedure 
followed by ACS in these investigations was essentially to 
verify that the reported data was in fact consistent with 
Temple’s internal documentation pertaining to the Loan.1 
On May 23, 2011, Temple resubmitted the information 
to TransUnion virtually unchanged.  Again, Temple did not 
indicate when the Loan first became delinquent or that it had 
ever been placed for collection.  Nor did Temple report by 
way of a “compliance condition” code that Seamans now 
disputed the trade line. 
 On August 1, 2011, Seamans contacted Temple, 
TransUnion, and another CRA, Equifax, again to dispute the 
                                                        
1
 ACS is not a defendant in this case.  Both parties 
appear to impute the actions, procedures, and policies of ACS 
to Temple throughout their briefing, and so far as we can tell, 
Temple does not legally attempt to distance itself from ACS 
in any respect.  Consequently, we at times refer to “Temple’s 
reporting” even in places where ACS acted as Temple’s agent 
with regard to the relevant filings and communications. 
7 
 
continued appearance of Temple’s trade line on his credit 
report.  Seamans’s letter to TransUnion stated: 
In 1989 I received a Perkins Loan 
while attending Temple 
University.  I defaulted on the 
loan and the loan went to 
collection.  No activity occurred 
on the account for some time, and 
the account eventually came off 
my credit reports for all three of 
the reporting agencies.  I recently 
began attending school again at 
Drexel University, and in order to 
qualify for financial aid, I had to 
settle the Perkins loan default.  I 
walked into Temple’s billing 
department and paid $2009 
dollars [sic] on the spot, receiving 
a letter on Temple University 
letterhead that the debt was 
settled.  Temple went on to 
retroactively report two years 
worth of 120-day late payments to 
the credit reporting agencies.  It is 
important to note that there was 
no reporting on this account to the 
credit bureaus for many years, and 
then suddenly after the debt was 
paid, Temple reported two years 
worth of late payments all at once. 
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I previously disputed this online, 
and received a letter stating that 
the creditor has reviewed the 
account and wishes to make no 
further adjustment to my credit 
record. 
 
To put it plainly, I want the 
Temple University account 
removed from my credit report.  
The account is closed, and well 
beyond the time limit imposed for 
the reporting of derogatory credit 
information.  Therefore, it should 
not appear on my credit reports 
now.  I have been a good 
consumer for years now, and the 
Temple reporting instantly 
negatively impacted my Trans 
Union score by approximately 80 
points. 
 
App. 258.  Temple was notified of the August 1 dispute and 
received copies of the letters written by Seamans to 
TransUnion and Equifax.  After a second investigation, 
Temple modified certain elements of its report on the Loan 
but still did not report the Loan’s history in collections, a date 
of first delinquency, or the fact that Seamans was disputing 
the accuracy of the reported information. 
Seamans points to evidence that Temple’s non-
reporting with respect to certain information about the Loan 
was not unique.  For example, an ACS employee testified at 
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deposition that at least until late 2011, ACS’s policy was that 
its employees would never flag an account as disputed, 
regardless of the nature of the consumer’s challenge: 
Q Let's go to the document ACS-2 
again.  Within ACS-2 can you 
point me to any particular portion 
of it which relates to reporting an 
account as disputed by the 
consumer in the compliance 
condition code portion of the 
Metro 2 code? 
 
A No, there is not. 
 
Q And is the reason for that 
because up until . . . November of 
2011, ACS did not report 
accounts as disputed to credit 
reporting agencies whether 
affirmatively or after a dispute 
had been received? 
 
A Correct. 
 
App. 485–86.  The same employee explained that ACS never 
included dates of first delinquency in its reports even after 
disputes were lodged.  App. 482–83.  A different customer 
service representative from ACS testified at deposition that 
she spent an average of 15 minutes on any given dispute and 
that ACS provided no written guidelines or formal training 
from managers for her.  App. 350–53. 
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 On October 28, 2011, Seamans filed a complaint 
against Temple in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that Temple 
negligently or willfully violated FCRA with respect to its 
reporting of the Loan.  On May 21, 2012, Temple moved for 
summary judgment, arguing in essence that HEA exempted it 
from compliance with FCRA because the credit instrument at 
issue was a Perkins Loan.  On October 25, 2012, the District 
Court granted the motion in full and entered judgment on the 
following day in favor of Temple.  Seamans appeals from that 
judgment. 
II. 
A. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1681p.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Our review of a District Court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors 
of Allegheny Health, Educ. & Research Found. v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 607 F.3d 346, 351 (3d Cir. 
2010).  A moving party is entitled to summary judgment only 
if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  A material fact is “[a] fact[ ] that might affect 
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  For an issue 
to be genuine, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence 
supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a 
jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the 
truth at trial.”  Id. at 249 (quotation marks omitted).  All facts 
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are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, who is “entitled to every reasonable inference that can 
be drawn from the record.”  Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. 
Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000).  Questions of 
statutory interpretation are also subject to de novo review.  
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d 
Cir. 2003). 
B. 
Seamans brings this action under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n 
and 1681o, which permit private suits for damages against 
parties who willfully or negligently fail to comply with 
certain duties to consumers under FCRA.  Specifically, 
Seamans contends that Temple’s investigation of his claims 
was unreasonable, and that even after he had lodged a 
detailed written dispute with TransUnion, Temple continued 
to omit the Loan’s history in collections, its date of first 
delinquency, and even the fact of his dispute itself.  He claims 
that these violations caused him to suffer actual damages in 
the form of “lost credit opportunities, harm to credit 
reputation and credit score, and emotional distress.”  He also 
seeks punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n for the 
violations that he contends were willful.  
Resolution of this appeal requires us to consider 
several discrete issues.  In Part III of this Opinion we address 
the extent of Temple’s duties under FCRA as a furnisher of 
credit information, and whether HEA materially impacts 
those duties.  In Part IV-A, we decide whether Seamans has 
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the completeness 
and accuracy of Temple’s post-dispute filings and the 
reasonableness of Temple’s post-dispute investigative and 
corrective procedures.  Next, in Part IV-B, we consider 
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Temple’s claim that FCRA does not permit private citizens 
such as Seamans to sue for damages caused by a furnisher’s 
failure to mark an account as disputed.  Finally, in Part IV-C, 
we address whether Seamans has stated a claim under § 
1681n for willful FCRA violations that, if proved, would 
allow him to recover punitive damages. 
III. 
A. 
FCRA, enacted in 1970, created a regulatory 
framework governing consumer credit reporting.  That 
framework “was crafted to protect consumers from the 
transmission of inaccurate information about them, and to 
establish credit reporting practices that utilize accurate, 
relevant, and current information in a confidential and 
responsible manner.”  Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 
688, 706 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).  Under 
FCRA, CRAs collect consumer credit data from “furnishers,” 
such as banks and other lenders, and organize that material 
into individualized credit reports, which are used by 
commercial entities to assess a particular consumer’s 
creditworthiness. 
FCRA imposes a variety of obligations on both 
furnishers and CRAs.  For instance, to protect consumers 
from having their credit forever impaired by aging debts, 
CRAs are precluded from reporting accounts which have 
been “placed for collection” or “charged to profit and loss” 
more than seven years prior to the report.  15 U.S.C. § 
1681c(a)(4).  Other “adverse item[s] of information,” aside 
from criminal convictions, also may be reported only for 
seven years after the adverse event.  Id. § 1681c(a)(5).  When 
13 
 
the seven-year threshold for these items is reached, CRAs 
may no longer lawfully report that data: in industry parlance, 
it has “aged off” the consumer’s credit report. 
When a furnisher provides information to a CRA 
regarding an account placed for collection or charged to profit 
or loss, the furnisher then has 90 days in which to notify the 
CRA of the account’s “date of delinquency,” which is defined 
as “the month and year of the commencement of the 
delinquency on the account that immediately preceded the 
action.”  Id. § 1681s-2(a)(5)(A).  The date of delinquency 
enables the CRA to calculate the seven-year window for 
“aging-off” purposes—without it, the CRA would be unable 
to determine when the account had been placed for collection, 
rendering the “aging-off” date impossible to calculate.2 
Temple concedes that under these provisions, if a non-
education loan had been first marked delinquent in early 1992 
and placed for collection later that year, a furnisher would be 
obligated to report those facts under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-
2(a)(5)(A).  Consistent with the terms of 15 U.S.C. § 
1681c(a)(4), the trade line would have “aged off” the 
consumer’s credit report at some point in 1999.  
B. 
HEA, enacted in 1965 and amended repeatedly 
thereafter, contains a provision that instructs CRAs to 
                                                        
2
 We use the term “seven-year window” somewhat 
loosely.  For purposes of accounts placed for collection or 
charged to profit and loss, the seven-year period technically 
begins 180 days after the date of first delinquency.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681c(c)(1). 
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disregard FCRA’s “aging-off” provisions when reporting data 
on certain federally backed education loans.  See 20 U.S.C. § 
1087cc(c)(3).  This section provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding paragraphs (4) 
and (5) of subsection (a) of 
section 1681c of Title 15, a 
consumer reporting agency may 
make a report containing 
information received from . . . an 
institution regarding the status of 
a borrower’s account on a loan 
made under this part until the loan 
is paid in full.  
 
Id.  The upshot of this provision is that a defaulted Perkins 
Loan, if left unpaid, can remain on a person’s credit report 
indefinitely—it does not “age off” a person’s credit report 
after seven years by operation of law.
3
  The bill’s legislative 
history explains the underlying rationale of that provision: 
These changes represent a 
simplification effort and provide 
consistency between the statute of 
limitations for collecting loans 
and the period for reporting 
negative credit information.  The 
                                                        
3
 The text of the provision is permissive, providing that 
CRAs “may make a report . . . until the loan is paid in full.”  
20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(c)(3) (emphasis added).  We express no 
opinion as to whether HEA affirmatively obligates CRAs to 
make such reports until qualifying loans are fully repaid. 
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committee believes that reporting 
of defaulted loans to credit 
bureaus is an effective tool and 
should be available to institutions 
and the Secretary of Education for 
the entire period that loan 
collection is allowed. 
 
S. Rep. No. 105-181, at 58 (1998).
4
 
C. 
We now consider whether the reporting obligations of 
Temple, a furnisher of consumer credit data under FCRA, are 
affected by 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(c)(3).  When, as here, the 
question is one of statutory construction, the appropriate 
starting place is with the statutory text.  “When the words of a 
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon [of statutory 
construction] is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.”  
                                                        
4
 The HEA provision at issue sits within a much 
lengthier section of the statute that establishes detailed 
furnishing and reporting requirements when an institutional 
furnisher enters into a formal “cooperative agreement” with a 
CRA.  See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(c).  The record 
before us contains no evidence of such an agreement.  
Because 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(c)(3) appears to be freestanding 
in the sense that its applicability does not depend on the 
presence of a formal “cooperative agreement,” we address the 
ramifications of that subsection only and express no opinion 
on the effect of other portions of 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(c) on a 
furnisher’s reporting duties under FCRA. 
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Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
The text of HEA is unambiguous in a crucial respect—
namely, it refers only to CRAs:  
Notwithstanding paragraphs (4) 
and (5) of subsection (a) of 
section 1681c of Title 15, a 
consumer reporting agency may 
make a report containing 
information received from  . . . an 
institution [of higher education] 
regarding the status of a 
borrower’s account on a loan 
made under this part until the loan 
is paid in full. 
 
20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(c)(3) (emphasis added).  The text does 
not mention furnishers of consumer credit data. 
Temple’s primary argument is that despite the absence 
of a specific reference to furnishers, HEA nonetheless 
functionally compels educational institutions to omit the date 
of first delinquency and collection history when reporting 
Perkins Loans to CRAs.  This is based on Temple’s worry 
that if it had continuously reported the Loan’s full history, 
including the items at issue such as collection history and date 
of delinquency, the CRAs may have failed to notice that the 
Loan was an HEA-qualifying education loan and instead may 
have treated the Loan as a standard-order defaulted debt.  
Under that scenario, according to Temple, the CRAs may 
have mistakenly allowed the Loan to “age off” Seamans’s 
credit report in 1999.  Temple rationalizes that by simply 
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omitting from its report all facts that could trigger the “aging 
off” provisions, Temple was helping the CRAs comply with 
20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(c)(3) and, in practice, furthering the 
congressional intent to prevent unpaid student loans from 
“aging off” credit reports. 
As an initial matter, we find it difficult to credit the 
implicit suggestion that Temple had no avenue, whether 
through the intricate coding system described above or in 
some other way, by which to signal affirmatively to the CRAs 
that a given loan is an HEA-qualifying education loan.  In 
other words, surely Temple could have allayed its own 
concerns about the CRAs’ possible mischaracterization of the 
Loan by providing them with more information rather than 
less. 
Nevertheless, whether this is the case or not, the 
question of whether a particular loan should or should not 
“age off” a credit report must be answered by the CRAs, and 
not by furnishers such as Temple.  If CRA procedures had 
allowed the Loan’s trade line to expire in 1999, in possible 
contravention of 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(c)(3), that would be the 
CRAs’ statutory concern, not an excuse for Temple to report 
loan information in an incomplete or inaccurate manner.  As 
stated recently by the Supreme Court, “even the most 
formidable argument concerning the statute's purposes could 
not overcome the clarity we find in the statute's text.”  
Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 607 n.4 (2012).  The 
strange compliance-by-omission described by Temple is not 
present in the statutory text at issue and we decline to read 
such a procedure into it. 
Temple also notes its belief that any loan fully repaid 
according to its original schedule will remain on a person’s 
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credit report for 10 years after final payment.
5
  Thus a “good 
borrower” could take out an education loan and fully pay the 
loan on schedule in 4 years, but would then carry the trade 
line on her credit report for 10 years afterward.  Temple 
claims that under Seamans’s reading of FCRA and HEA, a 
“bad borrower” who took out a federal education loan and 
immediately defaulted could then pay the loan 8 years later 
and see the trade line expunged immediately, because it 
would be more than 7 years past the date when the loan was 
sent for collection.  The “good borrower” thereby “carries” 
the trade line on her credit report for more time (14 years) 
than the “bad borrower” (8 years).  Temple suggests that this 
inequity is a good reason to interpret the relevant statutes in 
its favor. 
Temple has provided no evidence, however, that the 
appearance of a non-adverse payment history, i.e., the one 
appearing on the “good borrower’s” credit report, would 
impair the “good borrower’s” credit score.  There is nothing 
to show, in other words, that these disparate outcomes are 
inequitable to the “good borrower” at all.  Indeed, FRCA 
itself reflects a policy choice to allow dated adverse credit 
data to “age off” a credit report because such information 
might otherwise indefinitely hamper the borrowing 
capabilities of now-reformed individuals.  Non-adverse credit 
information, by contrast, can be reported indefinitely—at 
                                                        
5
 The record is unclear on this point.  There is evidence 
that Equifax has a policy under which it ceases reporting non-
adverse credit information after 10 years—that is to say, a 
borrower’s good credit history will only show up on an 
Equifax credit report for 10 years.  That window does not 
appear to be fixed by law. 
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least in part because it demonstrates that a person has been a 
reliable borrower in the past and will presumably continue to 
be such in the future. 
We thus disagree with the District Court’s conclusion 
that 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(c)(3) effectively exempts the Loan 
from FCRA’s “aging off” provision indefinitely.  Instead, the 
statutory text of 20 U.S.C. § 1087cc(c)(3)  makes clear that 
the seven-year window described in 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(4) 
is extended only “until the loan is paid in full.”  Accordingly, 
once Seamans’s loan had been repaid, the trade line 
pertaining to the Loan should have “aged off” his credit 
report pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(4), because the Loan 
by that time had been placed for collection more than seven 
years prior.  In reality, however, the trade line did not “age 
off,” and it did not “age off” because Temple never provided 
the CRAs with the collection history and date of delinquency.  
Instead, Temple’s incomplete and misleading reporting made 
it appear as if Seamans had simply made a late repayment on 
a non-defaulted loan in 2011, which, under 15 U.S.C. § 
1681c(a)(5), could be recorded on his credit report until 2018. 
Under the reading of HEA advanced by Temple, a 
borrower such as Seamans, who initially defaults on an 
education loan and then later repays it, is penalized twice: 
once because the loan, if unpaid, will not be removed from 
his credit report, and twice, because even after payment, the 
loan’s trade line will persist for another seven years.  We find 
this consequence to be inconsistent with Congress’s 
expressed intent that “reporting of defaulted [education] loans 
to credit bureaus is an effective tool and should be available 
to institutions . . . for the entire period that loan collection is 
allowed.”  S. Rep. No. 105-181, at 58 (1998).  The first 
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penalty, to be sure, is an “effective tool” indeed, providing 
great motivation for a borrower to repay even very old 
education loans.  The second penalty, however, reaches 
beyond the “period that loan collection is allowed,” and 
serves little purpose.  Once the debt is paid, the threat that the 
negative payment history will persist for another seven years 
as “adverse information” gives the borrower no further 
motivation—he has already done everything in his power to 
satisfy the debt. 
In sum, both a straightforward reading of the statutory 
text and an assessment of the legislative intent compel the 
conclusion that HEA did not exempt Temple, as a furnisher, 
from its typical reporting obligations under FRCA.  We 
conclude that furnishers of consumer credit data remain 
obligated to report fully and accurately under FCRA 
regarding the collection history and date of delinquency for 
even an HEA-qualifying education loan.  
IV. 
A. 
We now address whether Seamans has raised a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding his claim that Temple 
negligently failed to conduct a reasonable post-dispute 
investigation and thereafter failed to correct inaccurate and 
incomplete reporting as to the Loan.  Section 1681o
6
 
                                                        
6
 The relevant portion of § 1681o(a) states: 
 
Any person who is negligent in 
failing to comply with any 
requirement imposed under this 
21 
 
authorizes consumers to bring suit for damages caused by a 
furnisher’s negligent breach of its duties to consumers under 
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).
7
  See SimmsParris v. Countrywide 
                                                                                                                            
subchapter with respect to any 
consumer is liable to that 
consumer in an amount equal to 
the sum of- 
(1) any actual damages 
sustained by the consumer as a 
result of the failure; and 
(2) in the case of any 
successful action to enforce any 
liability under this section, the 
costs of the action together with 
reasonable attorney's fees as 
determined by the court. 
 
7
 The relevant portion of § 1681s-2(b)(1) states: 
 
After receiving notice pursuant to 
section 1681i(a)(2) of this title of 
a dispute with regard to the 
completeness or accuracy of any 
information provided by a person 
to a [CRA], the person shall- 
(A) conduct an 
investigation with respect to the 
disputed information; 
(B) review all relevant 
information provided by the 
[CRA] pursuant to section 
1681i(a)(2) of this title; 
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Fin. Corp., 652 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 2011).  Although 
furnishers such as Temple are obligated to provide complete 
and accurate information to CRAs even in the first instance, 
                                                                                                                            
(C) report the results of the 
investigation to the [CRA]; 
(D) if the investigation 
finds that the information is 
incomplete or inaccurate, report 
those results to all other [CRAs] 
to which the person furnished the 
information and that compile and 
maintain files on consumers on a 
nationwide basis; and 
(E) if an item of 
information disputed by a 
consumer is found to be 
inaccurate or incomplete or 
cannot be verified after any 
reinvestigation under paragraph 
(1), for purposes of reporting to a 
consumer reporting agency only, 
as appropriate, based on the 
results of the reinvestigation 
promptly- 
(i) modify that item of 
information; 
(ii) delete that item of 
information; or 
(iii) permanently block the 
reporting of that item of 
information. 
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i.e., before a dispute, under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a), FCRA 
explicitly precludes private suits for failure to comply with 
that statutory duty, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c), and instead 
provides for enforcement of that provision by federal and 
state officials, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(d).  The claims here are 
thus predicated solely on Temple’s conduct after it was 
informed of Seamans’s dispute by TransUnion. 
We have previously held that a furnisher’s post-dispute 
investigation into a consumer’s complaint must be 
“reasonable,” SimmsParris, 652 F.3d at 359, but did not 
expound upon what that standard requires.  We have 
recognized, though, that CRAs also are required to follow 
“reasonable procedures” with respect to the accuracy of 
consumer data under FRCA, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b),
8
 and 
in that similar context we have explained that a reasonable 
procedure is one “‘that a reasonably prudent person would 
undertake under the circumstances.’”  Cortez, 617 F.3d at 709 
(quoting Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 963 (3d 
Cir. 1996)).  That issue “is normally a question for trial unless 
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the procedures is 
beyond question.”  Id.  (quotation marks omitted). 
We also stated in Cortez that when assessing 
reasonableness, the factfinder must balance “the potential 
harm from inaccuracy against the burden of safeguarding 
against such inaccuracy.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals for the 
                                                        
8
 The relevant portion of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) states:  
“Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer 
report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning 
the individual about whom the report relates.” 
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Fourth Circuit has explicitly defined a furnisher’s duty in 
similar terms.  See Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 
426, 432–33 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the reasonableness 
of a furnisher’s investigation involves weighing “the cost of 
verifying the accuracy of the information versus the possible 
harm of reporting inaccurate information” (quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Van Veen v. Equifax Info., 844 F. Supp. 2d 
599, 605 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (applying Johnson).  We join our 
sister Circuit in holding that the same balancing test we 
applied in Cortez with respect to the reasonableness of a 
CRA’s procedures applies to investigations conducted by 
furnishers as well. 
Other Courts of Appeals have evaluated the 
reasonableness of a furnisher’s investigative procedure as it 
relates to the content of the notice of dispute sent by the CRA 
to the furnisher.
9
  For instance, where a given notice contains 
only scant or vague allegations of inaccuracy, a more limited 
investigation may be warranted.  See Boggio v. USAA Fed. 
Sav. Bank, 696 F.3d 611, 616–17 (6th Cir. 2012); Chiang v. 
Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 38–41 (1st Cir. 
2010); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 
1157–61 (9th Cir. 2009); Westra v. Credit Control of 
Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005).  Likewise, “[i]f a 
CRA fails to provide ‘all relevant information’ to a furnisher, 
                                                        
9
 As we explained in SimmsParris, “a consumer must 
first alert the [CRA] that reported the allegedly erroneous 
information of a dispute. It is then up to the [CRA] to inform 
the furnisher of information that there has been a dispute, 
thereby triggering the furnisher's duty to investigate. . . .”  
652 F.3d at 359.  Such notice “cannot come directly [to the 
furnisher] from the consumer.”  Id. at 358. 
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then the consumer has a private cause of action against the 
CRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i(a)(2)(A), 1681n-o, but not against 
the furnisher.”  Chiang, 595 F.3d at 38.  We agree that this 
too is an important factor in assessing the reasonableness of a 
furnisher’s investigation. 
The meaning of “completeness” and “accuracy” in the 
specific context of a furnisher’s duties under FCRA is also a 
matter of first impression in this Court.  It is not seriously 
debated, however, that factually incorrect information is 
“inaccurate” for purposes of FCRA.  See, e.g., Boggio, 696 
F.3d at 617.  And we agree with the three Courts of Appeals 
to have considered the question that even if the information is 
technically correct, it may nonetheless be inaccurate if, 
through omission, it “create[s] a materially misleading 
impression.”  Saunders v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. of 
Va., 526 F.3d 142, 148 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Boggio, 696 
F.3d at 617; Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1163.  Whether technically 
accurate information was “‘misleading in such a way and to 
such an extent that [it] can be expected to have an adverse 
effect’” is generally a question to be submitted to the jury.  
Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Saunders, 526 F.3d at 
150).  
Here, the District Court granted Temple’s motion for 
summary judgment principally because Temple’s reporting 
had not caused the undesired trade line to appear on 
Seamans’s credit report.  App. 22–23.  In the alternative, the 
District Court found that Temple’s employment of an outside 
vendor, ACS, to conduct consumer credit investigations on 
Temple’s behalf was reasonable as a matter of law, App. 30–
31, and that the information actually provided by Temple in 
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response to Seamans’s dispute was complete and accurate in 
light of its obligations under FCRA and HEA.  App. 31–34. 
We disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that 
Seamans is unable to establish causation for the alleged harm 
to his credit and the associated negative consequences.  Under 
our interpretation of FCRA and HEA, the trade line’s 
appearance on Seamans’s credit report is directly traceable to 
Temple’s failure to report the Loan’s collection history and 
date of delinquency.  Whether the harms alleged by Seamans, 
i.e., a drop in credit rating and associated loss of credit 
opportunities, can be linked to the appearance of the trade line 
on his credit report remains a disputed question of fact. 
Similarly, the record contains genuine issues of 
material fact regarding the extent to which the above-
described omissions were attributable to unreasonable 
investigative and corrective procedures.  The parties agree 
that Temple was fully notified of the nature of Seamans’s 
dispute and in fact received, through proper channels, a copy 
of the August 1, 2011 letter in which Seamans provided a 
detailed basis for his complaint.  Evidence also exists that 
Temple’s loan servicer routinely allotted a minimal amount of 
time to the investigation of each claim, and that its 
investigative procedures and corrective protocols regarding 
accounts sent for collection and dates of first delinquency 
were justified by a plainly erroneous interpretation of 
Temple’s legal obligations as a furnisher.  Under the 
standards we announced in Cortez, we find on the record 
before us a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Temple’s conduct was reasonable. 
Finally, we conclude that the District Court erred with 
respect to its characterization of Temple’s reporting as 
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indisputably accurate and complete.  As described above, the 
information Temple provided may have been incomplete and 
inaccurate insofar as it did not disclose the account’s date of 
first delinquency or the fact that the account had been placed 
for collection in 1992. 
In sum, we conclude that genuine issues of material 
fact exist as to whether Temple negligently failed to comply 
with its obligations under FCRA.  Accordingly, we will 
vacate the District Court’s order granting summary judgment 
in favor of Temple and remand for further proceedings. 
B. 
Along with Seamans’s claim that Temple was 
obligated to correct its reporting of his account’s collections 
history and date of first delinquency, he contends that Temple 
violated FCRA by failing to flag his account as disputed in its 
later reporting to TransUnion and other CRAs.  FCRA 
imposes an explicit duty on furnishers of credit information to 
report a dispute to all CRAs to whom it provides the 
information as part of a reasonable investigation.  15 U.S.C. § 
1681s-2(a)(3).
10
  Private enforcement of that obligation, 
                                                        
10
 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(3) states:  
 
If the completeness or accuracy of 
any information furnished by any 
person to any [CRA] is disputed 
to such person by a consumer, the 
person may not furnish the 
information to any [CRA] without 
notice that such information is 
disputed by the consumer. 
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however, as with other duties arising under § 1681s-2(a), is 
not permitted.  Id. § 1681s-2(c)(1).  The question presented is 
whether a furnisher’s continuing failure to flag an account as 
disputed also constitutes a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-
2(b), which as discussed above, requires complete and 
accurate post-dispute reporting of debts, and is privately 
enforceable by virtue of § 1681o. 
The two Courts of Appeals to have considered this 
question have both answered it in the affirmative.  In 
Saunders v. Branch Banking, discussed supra, the Fourth 
Circuit considered the interaction of § 1681s-2(a), which 
requires complete and accurate pre-dispute reporting of loan 
data, and is not privately enforceable, with § 1681s-2(b), 
which imposes investigative and corrective duties on 
furnishers, and is privately enforceable.  526 F.3d at 148–50.  
The panel noted that “[n]o court has ever suggested that a 
furnisher can excuse its failure to identify an inaccuracy when 
reporting pursuant to § 1681s-2(b) by arguing that it should 
have already reported the information accurately under § 
1681s-2(a).”  Id. at 149–50.  In other words, the fact that a 
furnisher is affirmatively obligated to flag an account as 
disputed under § 1681s-2(a) does not undermine the 
conclusion that a failure to flag the account as disputed also 
constitutes a material inaccuracy under § 1681s-2(b).  See 
also Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1163 (explaining that where a 
dispute is bona fide, “the omission of the disputed nature of a 
debt could render the information sufficiently misleading so 
as to be ‘incomplete or inaccurate’ within the meaning of [§ 
1681s-2(b)]”); Van Veen, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (applying 
Saunders and Gorman).   
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We agree with this assessment, and conclude that a 
private cause of action arises under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) 
when, having received notice of a consumer’s potentially 
meritorious dispute, a furnisher subsequently fails to report 
that the claim is disputed.
11
  We further find that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists as to whether Temple violated 
that duty here.  The District Court held that Temple was 
under no obligation to report Seamans’s dispute because that 
dispute “was not bona fide given the status of [the Loan] 
                                                        
11
 Temple argues that our holding in SimmsParris 
supports the opposite conclusion.  We disagree.  That 
decision simply clarifies that before a consumer can bring a 
private claim against a furnisher for failure to provide 
accurate information to CRAs, he must first notify the CRA, 
who then notifies the furnisher and thereby triggers the 
furnisher’s duty to undertake a reasonable investigation and 
corrective measures if warranted.  SimmsParris, 652 F.3d at 
359.  
 
It may seem peculiar that FCRA compels a furnisher, 
who can only be formally notified of a dispute by a CRA, to 
then re-designate the account as disputed in its submission 
back to the same CRA, which of course already knows about 
the dispute, having been the initial recipient of notice from 
the consumer.  But this requirement serves two purposes: 
first, the furnisher, not the CRA, is in the best position to 
determine whether the dispute is bona fide, and thus the 
furnisher’s validation of the dispute signifies that the dispute 
is genuine; and second, the furnisher must provide notice of 
the dispute to all CRAs to whom it originally submitted the 
information—not just to the CRA which initially notified the 
furnisher of the dispute. 
30 
 
under the HEA.”  For the reasons already stated, however, we 
find that Seamans’s dispute appears to have merit, and the 
failure to report that dispute may constitute a material 
inaccuracy on Seamans’s credit report. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment for Temple on Seamans’s claims 
under § 1681o insofar as they are predicated upon an alleged 
violation of § 1681s-2(b) for failure to report the disputed 
nature of the Loan.   
C. 
Along with permitting actual damages, costs, and 
attorney’s fees for negligent violations of duties imposed 
under § 1681s-2(b), FCRA also provides for an award of 
punitive damages for willful violations of those same duties 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
12
  Liability for willful violations 
                                                        
12
 The relevant portion of § 1681n(a) states: 
 
Any person who willfully 
fails to comply with any 
requirement imposed under this 
subchapter with respect to any 
consumer is liable to that 
consumer in an amount equal to 
the sum of- 
(1)(A) any actual damages 
sustained by the consumer as a 
result of the failure or damages of 
not less than $100 and not more 
than $1,000; or 
. . . 
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will lie not only in the case of knowing violations of the 
statute but also if a defendant acts with “reckless disregard” 
of the statute’s terms.  Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 
U.S. 47, 69 (2007).  “[A] company subject to FCRA does not 
act in reckless disregard of it unless the action is not only a 
violation under a reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, 
but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law 
substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading 
that was merely careless.”  Id.  An actor’s “subjective bad 
faith” is irrelevant—the test is whether the actor’s conduct 
was “objectively unreasonable.”  Fuges v. Sw. Fin. Servs., 
Ltd., 707 F.3d 241, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2012). 
In determining whether an actor’s conduct was 
reckless, a court should examine the text of the statute, case 
law that existed at the time of the alleged violation, and any 
agency interpretations.  Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69–70.  “[A] 
dearth of authoritative guidance” makes it less likely that a 
party’s conduct was objectively unreasonable, but the absence 
of such authority does not “immunize” an actor from potential 
liability where the statute is “far too clear” to support the 
                                                                                                                            
(2) such amount of 
punitive damages as the court 
may allow; and 
(3) in the case of any 
successful action to enforce any 
liability under this section, the 
costs of the action together with 
reasonable attorney's fees as 
determined by the court. 
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actor’s interpretation.  Cortez, 617 F.3d at 721–22.  We have 
noted as to FCRA in particular that: 
[T]he breadth and scope . . . is 
both evident and extraordinary. . . 
.  Moreover, it is undeniably a 
remedial statute that must be read 
in a liberal manner in order to 
effectuate the congressional intent 
underlying it. . . .  [I]t is 
imperative that we do not allow a 
company that traffics in the 
reputations of ordinary people a 
free pass to ignore the 
requirements of the FCRA each 
time it creatively incorporates a 
new piece of personal consumer 
information in its reports. 
 
Id. at 721–23 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  
A furnisher’s objectively unreasonable actions with 
respect to a particular consumer’s account can support a jury 
finding of willfulness.  Blanket policies, too, can underpin 
such a finding.  See, e.g., Boggio, 696 F.3d at 620 (remanding 
for a jury trial as to whether a furnisher’s policy 
“prohibit[ing] its employees from performing anything more 
than a cursory confirmation of [the consumer’s] status before 
reporting back to a CRA” constituted willful violation of the 
FCRA); Van Veen, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (denying 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to willfulness 
where furnisher’s policies “never result in marking an 
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account as disputed” and where the furnisher’s analysts were 
allotted only “5 to 10 minutes” for investigations). 
Here, the District Court endorsed the reasonableness of 
Temple’s conduct and concluded that a jury could not find 
Temple had acted willfully under Safeco.  App. 24–25.  But 
as noted earlier, we conclude that Temple’s construction of 
the HEA is in fact foreclosed by the straightforward statutory 
text.  HEA simply does not affect reporting obligations under 
FCRA for furnishers such as Temple.  Beyond that, Seamans 
points to evidence that undertrained ACS representatives 
spent, on average, only 15 minutes investigating each dispute, 
and that the policy of ACS was to never flag accounts as 
disputed or to report dates of first delinquency.  If true, these 
policies would appear to be in outright conflict with a 
furnisher’s duties under FCRA. 
We will therefore vacate the District Court’s order 
with respect to its dismissal of Seamans’s claim for punitive 
damages under § 1681n and remand for further proceedings. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order of October 25, 2012, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
